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Potential Controversies: Causation and the Hodgkin and Huxley Equations 
Abstract 
The import of Hodgkin and Huxley’s classic model of the action potential has been hotly 
debated in recent years, with particular controversy surrounding claims by prominent 
proponents of mechanistic explanation (Bogen, 2008; Craver, 2008). For these authors, the 
Hodgkin-Huxley (HH) model is an excellent predictive tool but ultimately lacks 
causal/explanatory import. What is more, they claim that this is how Hodgkin and Huxley 
themselves saw the model. In the following, I argue that these claims rest on a problematic 
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1. Introduction 
 
The Hodgkin and Huxley model of the action potential is in many ways the last thing one 
would expect to be the subject of controversy. It is a mainstay of neuroscience education and 
stands among the most celebrated achievements in its various histories and retrospectives. 
One need not look far to see comments like Armstrong and Hille’s that “the period from 
1939 to 1952 was a heroic time in the study of membrane biophysics” (1998, 371)1 or 
Francisco Bezanilla’s that “the beauty and simplicity of voltage-dependent conductances in 
the Hodgkin and Huxley (HH) equations goes way beyond explaining the generation and 
propagation of the action potential” (2008, 457). In recent years, however, the model and its 
significance have received considerable scrutiny. According to an interpretation defended by 
well-known proponents of mechanistic explanation (Bogen, 2008; Craver, 2007; 2008), the 
model cannot, when taken in historical context, be understood as a genuine causal 
explanation. What Hodgkin and Huxley provided, they argue, was a phenomenal model able 
to “describe the electrical behavior of giant squid axon preparations in a mathematically 
convenient form” (Bogen, 2008, 1036) but silent about how it is produced. The HH model, 
they allege, occupies a space not unlike Ptolemaic astronomy (Craver, 2008, 1026). 
At the outset, it is important to know the basic model. At its core lies the so-called total 
current equation: 
(1)   I = CMdV/dt + Gkn
4(V - Vk) + GNam
3h(V - VNa) + Gl(V - Vl) 
On the left side, we have “total” current, on the right lies the capacitive current and three 
ionic currents corresponding to potassium, sodium, and leak channels, respectively. The three 
channel terms have both “G’s,” representing their maximum conductances, and driving 
forces, in which each ionic equilibrium voltage is subtracted from the present voltage (the 
greater the difference, the stronger the force). The middle two terms likewise feature 
                                                          
1 The reason given, unsurprisingly, is that “During this period, Hodgkin and Huxley 
explained the propagated action potential” (371).  
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conductance terms, n, m, and h, which were chosen for a mixture of theoretical reasons, 
simplicity, and goodness of fit. The equation’s implications will be explored in greater detail 
below, but for now it suffices to say that it provides highly accurate predictions about the 
form of the action potential.  
The predictive success is not what is at issue, however. What matters is whether the 
model offers a causal explanation. For the above-cited authors, it does not. This is because, 
they argue, causal explanations must make contact with the entities and activities underlying 
the phenomenon. They need to tell us what sodium and potassium channels do to produce 
action potentials. The HH model, they allege, is agnostic about such things. Indeed, it would 
be decades before the relevant physical mechanisms would be even dimly understood. In 
support of this interpretation, the authors rely on two important claims. The first is that 
Hodgkin and Huxley do not offer a causal interpretation of the model in their paper. Indeed, 
they “insist” otherwise (Craver, 2008, 1022). Particularly supportive is a passage toward the 
end of the 1952 paper where the model is proposed. Their predictive success, Hodgkin and 
Huxley claim, “must not be taken as evidence that our equations are anything more than an 
empirical description of the time-course of the changes in permeability to sodium and 
potassium. An equally satisfactory description of the voltage clamp data could no doubt have 
been achieved with equations of very different form…the success of the equations is no 
evidence in favour of the mechanism of permeability change that we tentatively had in mind 
when formulating them” (1952c, 541). Roughly put, if Hodgkin and Huxley did not think of 
the model in causal terms, we should not either. The second major point concerns the role 
curve fitting played in the fixation of the conductance terms, n, m, and h. The functional 
relationship between these terms and the axon membrane potential was, they note, selected 
by Hodgkin and Huxley according to how well the function fit antecedently gathered data. 
The problem is that the results of such “curve fitting” measures carry no force. They may 
provide a good “data summary” (Craver, 1030), but strictly speaking, the equations will be 
“neither true nor false, neither explanatory nor descriptive” (Bogen, 2008, 1034).  
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Overall, they present a persuasive picture. After reading the mechanists’ papers, it is hard 
to think of the model as aiming for a causal explanation. Nevertheless, I argue, it does. In the 
following I hope to show why. First, I present textual evidence that Hodgkin, Huxley, and 
their contemporaries interpreted the model (including the controversial conductance terms) 
causally. Evidence to the contrary, such as the quote above, can be defused without too much 
trouble. Next, I argue that worries about “curve fitting” are exaggerated. The method by 
which they arrived at their conductance terms was theoretically motivated and came with 
important causal implications. Finally, I consider whether the model “explains” the action 
potential. I argue that Hodgkin and Huxley explained the action potential as they conceived 
of it but perhaps not on other potential ways of framing the phenomenon. 
 
2. Interpreting HH Causally 
 
I begin with the most general arguments against a causal reading. Though both 
mechanists make the claim, I shall focus on Craver’s argument, as he spends the more time 
on the issue. The non-causal reading is supported by at least two historical claims, one 
negative and the other positive. On the negative side, he argues that there is insufficient 
evidence in the quantitative paper and subsequent work to indicate that the authors saw the 
model as anything more than a mere formalism. We can choose to interpret it causally, but 
Hodgkin and Huxley give us no reason to (truthfully, they actively oppose it). In the positive 
part, he makes the additional claim that the state of knowledge at the time renders a 
causal/explanatory interpretation anachronistic. Our reading, Craver alleges, is tinted by 
factors “difficult for those who know much more than Hodgkin and Huxley did about the 
mechanism of the action potential to forget” (1028). If we were to strip away this implicit 
background knowledge, it would become clear that the authors didn’t have enough 
knowledge to meaningfully interpret the model (and the conductance terms in particular) 
causally. 
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Both claims draw on a conceptual distinction between mathematical structure of the kind 
seen in the HH model (that conductance is a function of voltage, say) and causal relations 
(that voltage causes conductance change). The two are easily equivocated, but they involve 
very different commitments. In and of itself, Craver argues, the mathematical model doesn’t 
separate causal relations mere correlations. More powerfully still, its deductive consequences 
will be the same “whatever one’s interpretation of the causal structure” (1030). We can 
manipulate the model however we like. He is not arguing the “absurd” position that causal 
explanations cannot be given in mathematical language, but if the math is meant to embody 
causal claims, this must be made clear: “the equations must be supplemented by a causal 
interpretation: one might, for example, agree by convention that the effect variable is 
represented on the left, and the cause variables are represented on the right, or one might add 
‘these are not mere mathematical relationships among variables but descriptions of causal 
relationships in which this variable is a cause and this other is an effect’” (2008, 1027). From 
here, the argument moves to the historical contention that Hodgkin and Huxley provide no 
such interpretation. This premise may be supported by the supposed absence of an 
interpretation in their writing, quotes where Hodgkin and Huxley seem to rebuff causal 
readings, and the aforementioned claim that details needed to provide a proper causal 
interpretation weren’t available at the time. To be clear, there is no denial that the authors had 
some relevant causal knowledge of the system, it’s that they did not have enough and that 
what they did have they generally did not “include explicitly in the model” (1027). 
First, let’s assess the claim that they don’t give the model a causal reading. It’s true that 
they don’t state “these are not mere mathematical relationships,” but this is far from 
damning. Such statements don’t occur in most scientific papers. More commonly, context 
specifies whether a mathematical dependency (or an arrow in a picture, or the phrase 
“depends on” in a sentence) is causal. Hodgkin and Huxley’s case is no different. When one 
examines the experiments discussed and the way they talk about the model, there is more 
than enough material to unambiguously indicate a causal reading. To start with, they use a lot 
of causal terms (a fact noted by Weber, 2008), even when discussing the conductance terms 
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(challenging Weber’s (2008, 1000) conductance-excluding view (see below)). One finds 
passages like: “an effect of this kind is to be expected on our formulation, since the entry of 
Na+ which causes the rising phase, and the loss of K+ which causes the falling phase, are 
consequent on increases in the conductance of the membrane to currents carried by these 
ions” (1952c, 529, emphasis mine). Likewise, in his Nobel speech, Huxley describes the 
calculations much as one would discuss concrete experimental preparations, writing that 
“we…calculated the responses of our mathematical representations of the nerve membrane to 
the equivalent of an electrical stimulus” and “calculating the effect of a stimulus [to the 
model]…one would see the forces of accommodation-inactivation of the sodium channel, 
and the delayed rise of potassium permeability-creeping up and reducing the excitatory effect 
of the rapid rise of sodium permeability” (1972, 61; again, it seems like conductance is 
included, as the “forces of…inactivation” likely refers to the h conductance term). None of 
these quotes suggests the authors saw the model or “formulation” as causally uncommitted.  
The major hurdle to the causal reading is, of course, the lengthy quote claiming that 
predictive success “must not be taken as evidence that our equations are anything more than 
an empirical description” (541). It’s easy to see this as offering a phenomenal interpretation 
of the model, even if the quotes above speak against this view. If one considers the full quote 
and its context, however, another interpretation emerges: they are merely expressing a 
transient underdetermination claim. They faced a modelling choice between first-order and 
higher-order kinetics for conductance (see below). The available evidence did not favor 
either, though they did imply different kinds of systems (Hodgkin and Huxley, 1952c, 512). 
Knowing this, the “must not be taken as evidence” probably refers to the fact that the 
likelihood of their model given the evidence was no greater than the likelihood of the 
alternative higher-order model. This gains support from the fact that the immediately 
following sentence refers to an “equally satisfactory alternative.” If so, the causal reading of 
the equations would be insulated. No one is defending the thesis that causal claims cannot be 
underdetermined at the time of their introduction. Moreover, if they are discussing 
comparative evidence, it would actually presuppose a causal view. The hallmark of a 
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phenomenal model is that it is not intended to make claims about the world. It’s not the kind 
of thing one gathers evidence for or against. 
What about the claim that Hodgkin and Huxley didn’t have enough information for a 
legitimate causal interpretation? One of the main contentions, recall, is that explanatory 
readings inadvertently import background knowledge unavailable before the 70s or 80s. 
Weber in particular is taken to task for the “historically inaccurate” suggestion that they “had 
any knowledge of voltage-gated channels” (Craver, 2008, 1031). Even if the previous 
paragraph is correct in its argument, this claim could still pose a problem. A model can be 
presumed to capture causal regularities without its creators actually knowing enough to make 
sense of its workings. That is, one could grant that they read the model causally and still 
think that they only had sufficient background to meaningfully interpret half of it.  
To assess the issue more clearly, we first need a sense of what a causal interpretation 
demands. Obviously, if the only thing sufficient to provide an interpretation is molecular 
detail, then Hodgkin and Huxley did not have enough information. It’s doubtful that the 
mechanists are making such a demand, though. Although molecular details may be 
emphasized (Craver, 2008, 1029), other writings suggest a less firmly reductionist stance. 
Craver (2007), for example, states that nothing on his view implies “a privileged level at 
which all causes act or at which all relevant causes are located” (2007, 104), noting that 
causal variables could be as broad as socio-economic status. In any event, the fact is that we 
still don’t know all the central molecular details. When it comes to sodium channels, for 
example, the term “conformational change” plays a role not unlike “inactivation” once did. 
Hodgkin and Huxley couldn’t have explained the action potential because we haven’t. Rather 
than molecular detail, then, I’ll follow Craver (2007) in adopting a broadly interventionist 
stance on causation (Pearl, 2000; Woodward, 2003). The model will have a causal 
interpretation if its features map onto (potentially “ideal”) interventions on the system. To 
avoid anachronisms, I’ll require that these interventions be recognized by the authors or their 
near-contemporaries. It isn’t enough that we can interpret parts of the model as 
transmembrane integral proteins if nobody near the time would have. 
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The issue, then, is whether the equations embody interventions recognized by Hodgkin, 
Huxley, and their peers. I claim they do. The model contains a particular set of mathematical 
dependencies (Craver, 2008). Total current (I) is a function of four sub-currents. These are 
then functions of still further variables and so on until we arrive at a set of exogenous 
variables that are left as-is. The relationships are a bit easier to see if, following conventions 
from the causal modelling literature, they are represented as a directed graph (fig.1).  
 
Figure 1. A graphical representation of functional relationships in the HH equations. Arrows 
reflect causal and constitutive relations between variables. V represents voltage, I’s represent 
the total and component currents, and E’s represent equilibrium voltages. Primed variables 
reflect the rate of change of the conductance terms m, n, and h. Terms not shown, such as the 
alphas and betas for sodium and potassium, are treated as parameters. Following Iwasaki and 
Simon (1994) and Voortman, Dash, and Druzdzel (2012), integration over time is 
represented with dashed lines. Consistent with their experimental practice, voltage is treated 
as an exogenous, experimenter-controlled variable. In simulating the action potential and 
related phenomena, V is no longer regarded as exogenous and is instead determined by 
integrating ionic currents (Hodgkin and Huxley’s discussion of simulation procedures covers 
522-40 in the paper). 
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Are the mathematical dependencies in the system something Hodgkin and Huxley 
could’ve given sufficient interpretation? I claim that they are. There is obviously quite a lot 
here, and there is neither space nor reason to discuss every dependency. We can, however, 
cover some of the more salient features. Each of the following relates to some experiment, 
physical basis, or otherwise cause- or intervention-implying language (parentheses contain 
1952c page numbers unless otherwise stated):  
a) Independence of potassium, sodium, and leak equilibrium potentials (the “Es”) 
(505) 
b) Independence of potassium, leak, and sodium permeability, contingent on 
voltage (V) (503) 
c) Dependence of both sodium and potassium channel conductance on the “effect 
of the electric field on the distribution or orientation of molecules” that 
allow/prevent ionic passage (501, 507, 512) 
d) A distinct inactivating agent for the sodium (h) but not potassium channels (503, 
512) 
e) Myriad facts about how modulating temperature and ionic concentrations will 
impact neuron (525-6; Huxley, 1972, 64-7) 
Many of these had been tested by Hodgkin and Huxley themselves. Point (a), for example, 
implies that one may change the various ions’ equilibrium potentials individually, selectively 
altering the ionic currents associated with each (Hodgkin and Huxley, 1952a), while (b) 
implies the dissociability of the channels (suggested in Hodgkin and Huxley, 1952b) and 
shown by later blockage experiments. Not every part had a prior experiment, of course. This 
is certainly true of the much-maligned conductance terms. Yet it’s worth noting that even in 
this uncertain element of the model we find discussions in concrete terms. Potential 
interventions are obvious. The presence of an inactivating agent for sodium channels implies 
the dissociability of sodium inactivation from sodium conductance, for example. This ideal 
intervention became a real one when Armstrong, Bezanilla, and Rojas (1973) (who explicitly 
Copyright Philosophy of Science 2017 
Preprint (not copyedited or formatted) 
Please use DOI when citing or quoting 
discuss the HH model) found they could selectively eliminate sodium inactivation using 
intercellular enzymes. Finally, though (a)-(e) are all dependencies that panned out, there is 
one important instance where the model got it wrong. Sodium is inactivated by a distinct 
“particle,” but it is not voltage-dependent as implied. This might seem detrimental to my 
case, but the fact is that this was/is regarded as a shortcoming in the model (Aldrich, 2001). 
Thus, on this issue, Armstrong et al. indicate that their results implied an inactivation 
mechanism “not entirely consistent with the Hodgkin and Huxley equations” (1973, 388). If 
the equations can get interventions wrong, however, it clearly cannot be the case that they 
make no commitments (Craver, 2008, 1026) or are “neither true nor false” (Bogen, 2008, 
1034).  
  
3. What about curve fitting? 
 
Despite the arguments listed above, there’s likely some residual uneasiness about the 
methods used to determine the conductance terms. The precise form each took and the values 
of the alpha and beta functions associated with them were determined largely as a matter of 
convenience and agreement with experimentally derived curves. Bogen, for instance, labels 
the n, m, and h terms “uninterpreted weighting constants” (1042). Even Weber (2008), who I 
have otherwise found much reason to agree with, grants that “the conductance model was 
purely a result of curve fitting to which Hodgkin and Huxley tried to give a physical rationale 
later” (1001), arguing that the explanatory work is done by the rest of the model.  
Such negative assessments are unwarranted, I argue, not only because Hodgkin and 
Huxley thought of the conductances in causal terms (see above) but because their methods 
have been unfairly criticized. In particular, previous commenters have not distinguished 
between two relevantly different modeling practices. The first, which I’ll simply call curve 
fitting, involves fitting a stock function to some data set. The prototypical case is something 
like linear regression, where the parameters have no theoretical basis and involve no causal 
commitments. A relevantly different process, sometimes called model fitting, is carried out to 
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estimate the value of parameters2 in an antecedently hypothesized system. The fundamental 
causal model (what connects to what) stays the same, one simply pins down the precise 
amounts, rates, etc. involved. Hodgkin and Huxley’s practice is better seen as the latter. 
The path Hodgkin and Huxley took ran roughly as follows. First, each conductance term 
was taken, for theoretical reasons, to be a dimensionless variable sensitive to voltage and 
time (rather than, say, current; 501, 507). From here, they had to choose whether the 
variables would obey higher-order differential equations or first-order equations. The 
evidence didn’t favor either, but first-order kinetics were simpler. Each conductance term 
was modeled in terms of shifting “particles” obeying the equation: 
(2)                              
dx
dt
= αx(1 − x) − βxx 
where x stands for n, m, or h depending on the context and alpha and beta stand for the rates 
(i.e., frequencies) at which particles transition between allowing and preventing ions to pass 
through the membrane. The rates at which these particles transitioned were taken to be 
voltage-dependent, and functions mapping voltage to each were selected based on fit. 
Despite earlier (Weber, 2008) claims that Hodgkin and Huxley developed their physical 
model of the channel as an afterthought, there is evidence to suggest that the decision to 
model the system as they did was theoretically motivated. Circumstantially, it’s a bit easier to 
see a pre-existing “gating” picture leading to equation (2) than it is to see (2) emerging first 
and leading to the theory later on. Moreover, if Weber is correct in thinking that Hodgkin and 
Huxley’s comment that “the success of the equations is no evidence in favour of the 
mechanism of permeability change that we tentatively had in mind when formulating them” 
(541, italics mine) refers to the conductance terms, then it would imply that the interpretation 
came first. Finally, we have Huxley’s (2002) retrospective assertion that their final voltage-
                                                          
2 See also Pearl (2000) on the distinction between “causal” and “statistical” parameters, the 
latter being embedded in a causal model and the former making “no assumption whatsoever 
regarding the existence or nonexistence of unobserved variables” (38). 
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clamp results were interpreted “on the assumption that the ions crossed through channels that 
were opened or closed by alterations in the membrane potential” (557). This strongly 
suggests that the channel idea occurred to them on the heels of the experiments and was 
developed simultaneously with or prior to the formal 1952 model. 
If we grant this theoretical background, though, it’s hard to see the process as particularly 
suspect. The causal picture is in place. The only thing left over are a few parameters, each 
playing a clear role in the system. The power to which the terms are raised, for instance, are 
taken by Hodgkin and Huxley to reflect the number of “particles.” Values were estimated 
and, while not perfect, weren’t bad (sodium channels, m, have 4 rather than 3 subunits). One 
could double down on this shortcoming, but it would be splitting hairs, especially given the 
estimates were as close as they were. If I claim that an object thrown at x miles per hour (or 
more, Hodgkin and Huxley, 1952c, 509) broke a window, my account isn’t devastated if it 
happens that the object was actually going y > x miles per hour. The alpha and beta terms 
seem more complex on the surface, but the same basic point holds. They are rate constants 
given theoretically-motivated dimensions and functional roles by Hodgkin and Huxley. At 
base, they amount to a claim about the probability that (or “frequency” with which) a 
“particle” switches between states. One might claim that estimating the probabilities isn’t 
enough, that the reason why the probabilities take the values they do must be given, but this 
would clearly prove too much. It would amount to disputing probabilistic causality, as the 
rate constants simply represent the claim that modulating voltage will increase or decrease 
the frequency of a given kind of particle state-transition. What’s more, we still don’t build 
these terms “from the bottom up,” as the objection would demand; rather, there is a mix of 
macroscopic modelling techniques, with Hodgkin and Huxley’s remaining popular 
(Carbonell-Pascual et al., 2016). If the inability to unpack these fundamental probabilities 
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4. Concluding Remarks on Explanation 
 
The previous two sections argue that a causal reading of the HH model, conductance 
terms included, is most consistent with its authors’ scientific practice and published 
statements. This still leaves open the issue of explanation, though. It may be argued that, 
while causal, the model is still only a mechanism sketch, an explanation that leaves critical 
features unexplored (Craver, 2008, 1027). In response to this, I may point to the interventions 
enumerated above or to still others left unmentioned. I could cite earlier authors who have 
argued forcefully that the features left out of the model do not matter for the relevant 
explanatory purposes (Levy, 2014; Weber, 2008). Ultimately, though, there is a sense in 
which the sketch claim is correct. In his Nobel speech, Huxley plainly states that he and 
Hodgkin took the model as “a first approximation…for the actual mechanism of the 
permeability changes on the molecular scale” (1972, 69). This is not something that I think is 
sufficiently captured in either Weber or Levy’s discussions. Weber pins all non-explanatory 
talk on the conductance terms, but the quote above is directed at the “these equations” 
generally, rather than the conductance terms specifically. Levy grants that the model is not a 
sufficient molecular-level explanation but contends that it is “implausible” to regard the HH 
model as aiming toward such explanatory goals (482) and that, even if they started with this 
aim, their interests had shifted by the writing of the quantitative paper (487, fn. 9). Here 
again, though, Huxley does seem to think of the model as addressing, in a tentative way, 
some molecular concerns.  
I take it, then, that we ought not to deny that the authors sought a molecular explanation 
and successfully produced a “sketch” of one. Nevertheless, it cannot fairly be claimed that “if 
Hodgkin and Huxley are right, one needs to know [complex mechanistic details] to explain 
the action potential” (Craver, 2008, 1025) or that explanatory claims stem from illusions 
about the state of molecular neuroscience at the time (1030). When Hodgkin and Huxley 
speak of having a “sufficient explanation” of the relevant phenomena or when 
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contemporaries like Bezanilla claim that the model “goes way beyond explaining” the action 
potential, we cannot simply sweep it under the rug. 
What I would like to suggest in the brief space remaining is that Hodgkin and Huxley did 
explain the action potential as they understood it (1952c, 500, 541), but not as it might be 
interpreted by all parties involved. In other words, we are dealing with different explananda. 
The action potential could be understood in a “thin” way that refers only to the voltage spike 
familiar to physiologists going back to the 19th century. So understood, the action potential 
would be tied to a specific set of results, including things like anode breaks, voltage 
“overshoot,” and refractory periods (to list the phenomena cited by Hodgkin and Huxley, 
1952c; Huxley, 1972; Huxley, 2002). The action potential of an author like Craver (2008), by 
contrast, may be better described as a complex thing-in-the-world (Cf. Craver, 2014)—the 
kind of object molecular processes could be said to “make up” (1025). It involves a “thick” 
or open-ended notion more akin to Huxley’s “actual mechanism…on the molecular scale” 
(1972, 69). One is an object of classical electrophysiology, the other of biochemistry.  
In wondering whether Hodgkin and Huxley “explained the action potential,” then, one 
could be asking at least two different questions. If the goal is to account for voltage and 
current dynamics and to chart how they behave under interventions like the shifting of ionic 
concentrations or the elimination of specific channels, then the model appears sufficient. A 
few elements proved inaccurate (e.g. the voltage-dependence of sodium inactivation), but the 
model captures sufficiently many causal relations and experimental phenomena to be called 
an “explanation,” at least as the term is usually understood. However, if the aim is to 
characterize the biochemical mechanisms at play—to know about the structure, composition, 
or operation of ion channels (Cf. Bogen, 2008, 1043)—then Hodgkin and Huxley’s charged 
“particles” provide only the roughest of approximations. The causal picture from the 
previous sections may provide leads for investigating these matters, such as the existence of 
distinct agents of sodium inactivation, but they are highly general. The term “sketch” does 
not seem inappropriate. 
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Thus, depending on one’s interest, it may still be possible to side with Craver and Bogen 
in believing that the model does not “explain the action potential.” One’s reasons for doing 
so will need to differ from theirs, however. It cannot rightly be claimed that Hodgkin and 
Huxley make no causal commitments. As we have seen, the model is rich with implications, 
and many of them were followed up on by Hodgkin, Huxley, and their peers. Nor is it 
reasonable to criticize the model because of the role “curve fitting” played in its 
development. Doing so would catch perfectly legitimate causal modelling procedures in the 
cross-fire. Finally, it would not be fair to claim that the popular history of the model is 
anachronistic or that Hodgkin and Huxley themselves claimed not to have explained the 
“action potential.” This would mean interpreting the term quite differently than the authors or 
subsequent researchers in the same tradition. Bezanilla, Armstrong, and Hille, who did so 
much to discover the form and composition of ion channels, are not simply confused about 
how much Hodgkin and Huxley knew about these mechanisms. In the end, one parts little 
from the received view. The model provides a causal account of neuronal voltage dynamics 
and a very limited guide to molecular mechanisms. In other words, Hodgkin and Huxley 
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